

# Improving the relationship between National Security challenges and research

*The Work of the CSaP/Global Uncertainties Visiting Fellow*

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# Fellowship Objectives

## *What?*

Explore, develop and test mechanisms to promote engagement between academia and the National Security (NS) domain.

## *Why?*

Our research base has a vital contribution to make to the security of the UK and the wider world, but there's a disconnect between NS stakeholders who own the challenges, and researchers with answers.

# Who are the “NS stakeholders”?

This Fellowship has focused on the work of ...

- Centre for Applied Science & Technology (CAST) & Office for Security & Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office;
- Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI);
- Defence Science & Technology Lab (Dstl) in the MOD;
- Office for Cyber-Security & Information Assurance (OCSIA) in the Cabinet Office;
- Security & Intelligence Agencies: MI5, MI6, GCHQ.

# The Global Uncertainties Programme



A major theme of RCUK addressing the cross-cutting, interdisciplinary and international nature of security challenge. There are six themes.

- **Terrorism;**
- **Cyber-security**
- **Threats to Infrastructures**
- **Countering CBRN Proliferation**
- **Transnational Organised Crime**
- **Ideologies & Beliefs.**


# The NS Strategy

David Cameron and Nick Clegg, writing in the Foreword. October 2010

“

*Britain today is both more secure and more vulnerable than in most of her long history. We do not currently face a conventional threat of attack on our territory by a hostile power. But we are one of the most open societies, in a world that is more networked than ever before. All of this calls for a radical transformation in the way we think about national security and organise ourselves to protect it.*

”



# National Security Risks

National Security Strategy: page 27

The four highest priority risks facing the UK until 2015 are:

- terrorism (including a CBRN attack);
- hostile attacks on UK cyber-space and/or large-scale cyber-crime;
- major accidents or natural hazards (e.g. coastal flooding or a 'flu epidemic);
- international military crises.

## National Security Strategy: Priority Risks

Tier One: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be those of highest priority for UK national security looking ahead, taking account of both likelihood and impact.

- International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests, including a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack by terrorists; and/or a significant increase in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland.
- Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cyber crime.
- A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response, such as severe coastal flooding affecting three or more regions of the UK, or an influenza pandemic.
- An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK, and its allies as well as other states and non-state actors.

Tier Two: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be the next highest priority looking ahead, taking account of both likelihood and impact. (For example, a CBRN attack on the UK by a state was judged to be low likelihood, but high impact.)

- An attack on the UK or its Overseas Territories by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.
- Risk of major instability, insurgency or civil war overseas which creates an environment that terrorists can exploit to threaten the UK.
- A significant increase in the level of organised crime affecting the UK.
- Severe disruption to information received, transmitted or collected by satellites, possibly as the result of a deliberate attack by another state.

Tier Three: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be the next highest priority after taking account of both likelihood and impact.

- A large scale conventional military attack on the UK by another state (not involving the use of CBRN weapons) resulting in fatalities and damage to infrastructure within the UK.
- A significant increase in the level of terrorists, organised criminals, illegal immigrants and illicit goods trying to cross the UK border to enter the UK.
- Disruption to oil or gas supplies to the UK, or price instability, as a result of war, accident, major political upheaval or deliberate manipulation of supply by producers.
- A major release of radioactive material from a civil nuclear site within the UK which affects one or more regions.
- A conventional attack by a state on another NATO or EU member to which the UK would have to respond.
- An attack on a UK overseas territory as the result of a sovereignty dispute or a wider regional conflict.
- Short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources (e.g. food, minerals) essential to the UK.

# Seven Priority NS Challenges

Source: HMG White Paper *National Security through Technology* (February 2012) p 38

- protect from IEDs
- Identify/mitigate CBRN threats
- protect from cyber threats
- understand human & social dynamics
- communicate rapidly/effectively including data from sensors in challenging environments
- extract value from complex, multiple data sources, media and streams
- identify/assess future risks & threats.



# The CSaP Project: 76 Interviews


<i>Research Discipline</i>		<i>Behav'al &amp; Social</i>	<i>Bio-science</i>	<i>Business</i>	<i>Chemistry/ Materials</i>	<i>Computer Science</i>	<i>Engineering</i>	<i>Maths</i>
Academia	39	9	3	5	4	6	9	3
Industry	11	3	0	0	0	1	5	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>5</b>
<i>Government Departments</i>			<i>GO Science</i>	<i>Home Office</i>	<i>MOD</i>	<i>OCS IA</i>	<i>SIA</i>	
HMG	26		1	7	5	1	12	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>76</b>							



# The Phase 1 Report

## Key findings –

- Many instances of successful, often tactical, interaction but ...
- Cultural and logistical differences hamper effective engagement;
- We need to nurture relationships of trust;
- We need to accommodate and join up fundamental research and applied science and technology;
- We can experiment with practical mechanisms, and test strategic ideas, for achieving these goals.



# Obstacles to Engagement

## **Clash of Cultures**

Stereotypes around “Ivory Tower” academics and public servants devoted to saying “Yes Minister”.

## **Resources and Red Tape**

Complaints about bureaucracy on both sides; and significant concern about the approach agencies take to commissioning research (“Fire and Forget” and a “Procurement Mind-Set”).

## **Trust and Communication**

Issues of security/secrets constraining collaboration, with communications challenges of docking and translation.

# Key Conclusions

***Three inter-related principles***  
*underpin engagement between the two worlds*

- The Merits of Variety
- The Value of Intermediaries
- The Importance of a *Whole-Life* Plan, with four stages ...
  - **Access**
  - **Exchange**
  - **Commitment**
  - **Delivery.**

# Building Engagement

## 1. Access

*Make requirements of NS customers and capabilities of researchers visible and available for scrutiny.*

### **Examples**

- A portal managed by the Centre for Defence Enterprise, focussing on a call -“Finding the Threat” - where MI5 and GCHQ can reach out to sources of innovation;
- The Security & Resilience Industry Suppliers’ Council (RISC), and plans to create an Academic RISC.
- Gateway to Research - <http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk/> - being trialled by the Research Councils and BIS.

## 2. Exchange

*Develop trusting relationships: requirements and capabilities are better understood, identifying opportunities for research.*

### **Examples**

- In-house Summer Schools – SWAMP
- National Security Professors of Practice
- EPSRC/CPNI Sandpits and Ideas Factories
- Trial a National Security Fellowship Scheme.

### 3. Commitment

*Establish longer-term, strategic relationships, where both partners invest time and effort in collaborative research.*

#### **Examples**

- CSAs and SACs;
- Data-Release Facilities;
- NS Research Institutes;
- Strategic Research Programmes.

## 4. Delivery

*Turn research into capabilities, often with the help of capital markets & industry, to generate new products and services*

### **Examples**

- IP/IPR agreements;
- Accelerators/Incubators;
- Security Growth Partnership;
- Technology Strategy Board Programmes.

# The Message to Take Away

Remember the Importance of a *Whole-Life Plan*  
aka

## THE FOUR-ACT PLAY

- Access: put the players on the stage
- Exchange: let the characters get to know one another
- Commitment: establish lasting relationships of trust
- Delivery: reap the rewards of partnership.

**And plan all four acts from the get-go!**



# What Next?

## Professor Derek Smith

To discuss the challenge of building relationships of trust in researching and countering flu epidemics ... *including the National Security challenge.*

## Mark Phillips

To discuss the work of RISC and ideas for a Security Growth Partnership ... *including proposals for an "Academic RISC".*