

DR. STRANGELOVE I PRESUME? RACE, CLASS AND TACIT INTENTIONALITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGNS FOR NUCLEAR WAR

RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS?



In the previous chapter I considered that, across historical contexts, it can be shown that forms of disaster education implicitly favour the white, middle classes. Critical Race Theory considers that, as a system, white supremacy requires the active co-operation and support of individual whites. For example, Leonardo (2009, p. 110) describes the nature of white racial knowledge claiming that whites are actually aware of white supremacy otherwise white privilege operates without resistance or contestation. Ignatiev and Garvey's 'Race Traitor' project (1996) furthermore considers that whites (paradoxically) actively construct white supremacy through their *inaction*. By not actively refuting white identity as 'race traitors' they passively support the continuation of white privilege. However, disaster education, despite its tacit racism, is not the deliberate work of a group of white supremacists with the express desire to harm people of colour (although it may actually help in some cases to think about it in this way, for example, in counter-storytelling or in strategic forms of resistance) but neither can it be seen to fall out of human deliberation as an accident or as 'just what happens'.

In a cinematic fantasy of nuclear war and preparedness, Stanley Kubrick's (1964) film 'Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb', Peter Sellers portrays the titular character. Dr. Strangelove is an ex-Nazi scientist who informs the US on their nuclear strategy. Due to a series of errors, the US triggers a nuclear war which will eventually destroy life on the surface of earth. Dr. Strangelove, however, considers this as an opportunity to use deep shelters to eugenically preserve those with '...youth, health, sexual fertility, intelligence and a cross section of necessary skills. Of course, it would be absolutely vital that our top government and military men be included to foster and impart the required principles of leadership and tradition.' Dr. Strangelove is an old-fashioned white supremacist and eugenicist and far from the structural and embedded conception of white supremacy considered by critical race theorists (although the state is happy to go along with his plans). In my research which involved interviews with those involved in planning for nuclear war in the UK and in searches in the National Archives (a cache of UK government historical papers) I, obviously, did not find any 'Strangelovian' characters who considered that selective survival of nuclear war would be beneficial for eugenic purposes.

This leads to the question of how, if 'disaster education' is racially biased, why such oppressions arise. The intentionality of constructing preparedness materials, perhaps, is of a specific type of unintended consequence – a form of *tacit intentionality*. Gillborn (2005) refers to this tacit intentionality with regard to racial inequalities in educational policy making: 'Policy makers decide (tacitly, if not explicitly) to place race equity at the margins—thereby retaining race injustice at the centre.' (Gillborn, 2005, p. 499). Tacit intentionality is a form of knowing unknowingness for white people, a Gramscian 'common sense' view of the world.

In this chapter I trace the tacit intentionality of policy in terms of disaster education for nuclear war in the UK examining both 'Protect and Survive' (see previous chapter) and its precursor. The period under consideration, 1962 – 1989, can be considered to be part of the 'hot' cold war from the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 through to the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall. During this time there were two major public education campaigns for the general public educating them about nuclear war: The 'Householders Handbook' which was called 'Advising the Householder on Protection Against Nuclear Attack' (Home Office, 1963) and 'Protect and Survive' a booklet, newspaper supplement, series of television films and radio broadcasts. I use these to examine various reasons for tacit intentionality. Gillborn suspects that 'The racist outcomes of contemporary policy may not be coldly calculated but they are far from accidental.' (499) although I demonstrate how in the case of disaster education policy is not always in the province of policy makers so there are creative 'accidents' that exacerbate tacit intentionality:- 'the minute deviations – or conversely the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals and the faulty calculations that give birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us' (Foucault, 1984, p. 81). Methodologically, this analysis is, though, not a genealogy of preparedness but rather a counter-historical account, a counter-story, in which the absent / present (Derrida, 1998) of race within emergency planning (Chakrabarty, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2012) is given primacy although this does not mean neglecting other considerations (particularly of class although issues of gender and sexuality are apparent). In discussions with policy makers on the design of disaster education materials, 'race' was almost entirely absent but considerations of middle class whiteness were at the forefront. Hence the analysis is not exclusively about race or class, but at the intersectional nexus of race / class oppressions bringing in considerations of heteronormativity and morality. Analytically, the construction of the counter-historical account was based on documentary analysis from the National Archive, with interviews from those involved in the production of such materials (Former Home Office scientists, engineers and creatives – musicians and animators – who were tasked with designing these messages. Pseudonyms have been used in the below quotes) and from examination of preparedness materials. The general approach employed was one of critical discourse analysis, considering the construction of power in the texts, particularly in terms of 'whiteness' and 'middle class(ness)'.

RACE / CLASS BIAS IN 'THE HOUSEHOLDERS HANDBOOK' AND
'PROTECT AND SURVIVE'



Figures 3 and 4 (above): The cover of the 'Householders Handbook' (1963) and still from public information film 'Protect and Survive' (1980)

'Protect and Survive' and 'Advising the Householder on Protection against Nuclear Attack' (shown above) were public education campaigns to be used in the lead up to nuclear war and comprised not only booklets but also public information films. Both Protect and Survive and the Householders handbook took for granted that potential survivors possessed forms of 'capital' associated with the white, middle classes (Bourdieu, 1986). In terms of the 'Householders handbook' social, economic and cultural forms of capital are indicated as being necessary for survival. Firstly, social capital. The importance of street and neighbourhood was very much emphasised in the text for 'Advice to the Householder' (1963). Householders were

advised to make notes of the nearest warden post, the nearest warden, the street party leader, the nearest information centre and persons who should be in your refuge room. The advice centred on 'Preparing the House' (p. 14) and it was assumed that people lived in families. There was also an emphasis on civility and reciprocity but only to those caught outside accidentally 'Give refuge to those caught without protection near your home' (p. 16) (although this did not apply to those in flats, see below). Secondly, cultural capital artefacts such as 'books', 'chests of drawers' and 'heavy furniture' (p. 8) were named as being used to block out the nuclear attack. Thirdly, economic capital (money and skills) to buy sandbags, bricks, heavy pieces of wood and access to television and a car were assumed. The publication called out to the white middle classes in terms of their resources and housing:- 'A cellar or basement gives the most protection and is best for use as a fall out room' (p. 7) and in addition 'Choose on the ground floor with as little outside wall as possible' (p. 7). People without a private, durable, home were considered to have to rely on their own social support. For example, in terms of flats people were instructed to shelter with other flat dwellers rather than seek better protection in housing 'If you live in the upper floors you should try to arrange to join the people living on the ground floor' (p. 8). There was also an assumption that people could obtain building materials. The refuge room would need to be sandbagged externally and around the windows or the windows would be boarded or removed and bricked up a possibility. Windows and outside doors of halls and passages leading into the refuge room would also be blocked up. Sometimes, the classed nature of the advice mitigated against personal survival. For example, the advice on sanitation (a delicate issue for middle class morality) gives the reason for not using the usual toilet as '...the sewerage system might be damaged' (p. 18) whereas leaving the inner refuge for trips to even an undamaged and pristine toilet would expose that person to radiation.

There were also assumptions concerning the possession of social, cultural and economic capital in the (1980) Protect and Survive films within the context of a heteronormative family in private accommodation. I have italicised sections from the film dialogue to show the emphasis on property, fear of strangers (the 'homeless' and 'others') and the containment of those in other dwellings:-

Finally, don't forget to take your booklet 'Protect and Survive'. It tells you how to make *your home* and family as safe as possible' (What to put in the fall-out room)

Send *your young children* to the fall-out room... (Action after warnings)

After an attack you may have to stay *in your house* for about 14 days so make sure to store plenty of water and food for your family (Water and Food)

...in fact you are far better off *at home because it is the place that you know and where you are known*. So stay where you are. If you leave *your home*, your local authority may *take it over* for homeless families, and if you move, the authorities in the new place will not help you with food, accommodation or other essentials. You are better off at home. Stay there (Stay at home)

If you live *too high up to be safe*, you must make arrangements now with your neighbours in the lower floors (Stay at home)

If you live in a one storey house, like a bungalow or prefab....*make arrangements* to shelter with someone close by (Stay at home)

These 'tacit intentionalities' in the campaigns mean that a particular type of individual would be more likely to survive (see table 1 below). They would be more likely to live in the suburbs away from nuclear weapons, in their own (substantial and extended) house, in a traditional nuclear family and would be able to read and respond to the documents (which were never published in minority languages) in a coldly rational sense. The documents hence create survivors as white, middle class and heteronormative.

Table 1: How tacit intentionality 'makes' survivors

Victims would be...	Survivors would be...
Urban	Suburban / Rural
Living in flats / bungalows / caravans	Living in detached houses
Not able to make use of inner rooms / cellars	Able to make use of shelter in their own homes
Extended family / single	Traditional nuclear family
Dependent on state	Privatised
Passive and unresponsive	Active and agentic
'Other' / not English speaking	British / English Speaking

It would be incorrect to state that policy makers were unaware of these biases. In fact, it is clear from research in the National Archives on the policy process of constructing these documents that policy makers were well aware of the possible consequences of their decisions in terms of the types of people who might survive a nuclear war. The National Archive file T227/1526 is indicative in giving correspondence between civil servants from several departments who were working on the 'Householders handbook'. In a paper written by a civil servant working on the handbook (T.E. Nodder on 5th April 1962) he considered that:-

...it should, perhaps be pointed out that the booklet gives no answers as to the time at which, and within which, the construction etc. of refuges is to begin, nor as the source of the materials needed. It also leaves open questions about those too infirm to cope or too poor to buy stocks, and of communal refuge.

(National Archives, T227 / 1526)

In particular, the impact on food supplies and the (social) housing stock was a matter of concern. These were related partly to material class circumstances. The effects on the housing stock of those in 'rented' accommodation and the possibility of stocking up with food supplies for those on low budgets were notionally (if not practically) taken into consideration:-

It is not clear from the draft whether the Householder should immediately on its receipt get on with doing the many laborious tasks enjoined upon him. These, in a great many cases, will pretty well wreck his home, and take a good many hours to do. Most of the *normal life of the country will come to a stop* as he does them. Well and good if you are planning to put the booklet into letter boxes only at the very last moment (though in that case he is likely *not to have time to lay in all the supplies needed, even if sufficient are on the shelves of the local shops*). But if (as I would guess to be the most likely situation in practice) you put the booklet round before you think that 100% implementation is urgent should you not distinguish between things you should do now (getting in supplies, contacting wardens e.t.c.) and things you should do when instructed by the B.B.C. (the *home-wrecking things*). A lot of people will of course do both as soon as they read this booklet, but I would have thought that we would not have wished to encourage them to do so. If everything grinds to a halt because half the factory, shop, transport and office workers are knocking out the windows of their (*largely rented*) houses we might significantly add to the chances of mass panic

(Letter between civil servants: D.M.B. Butt letter to R.J.P. Hewison of 2nd November 1961, National Archives T227/1526, my italics)

Additionally, there was uncertainty by the government as to what to do concerning communal provision and shelter construction (Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Civil Defence, Advice to the Public : Note by the Chairman: 10th July 1962, National Archives T227/1526) and further concerns from the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods that the booklets demand that householders should build up stocks in an emergency would mean that '...there would not be enough in the shops at one time to provide even a 7-day stock of the appropriate foods for everyone; and that a great many people, even so, will not have enough ready money to but the necessary quantities immediately'. Rather, it was better to issue the booklet in peace time so that the public could stock up (Letter to Nodder, 14th June 1962, National Archives, T227/1526). In a memo to O.L. Williams of 6th July 1962, Nodder considered 'What are the food stocks for institutions, schools etc? How are the poor going to pay for the 14 days stocks?' (T227 / 1526).

As the above shows, there was considerable uncertainty on the part of civil servants as to the equity of the public education campaign. Rather than a 'tacit intentionality' of ignorance, or arrogance, there were more subtle reasons for the inequity of the finished campaigns.

Firstly, the public education campaigns did always not necessarily reflect the authorial intentions of the Home Office scientists and the creatives that worked on them. The final products were often the result of 'errors...false appraisals...faulty calculations' (Foucalt, 1971). In the case of the Protect and Survive films (1980), for example, the use of animation led to a compounding of errors and omissions. Protect and Survive was an example of developmental animation made in a form other than cell animation with an accessible narrative (Wells, 1998: 9). This was purposive and according to Wells this form of animation allows transgression of reality, in this case by the state of the horror of nuclear war:-

Animation legitimised the social and political ambivalence of such narratives by simultaneously approximating *some of the conditions of real existence whilst distancing* itself from them by recourse to the unique aspects of its own vocabulary

(Wells, 1998, 21–22, my italics).

Protect and survive used a complex (for the time) technique called 'superimposition' where a first image or video was placed on top of an existing image or video to produce a juxtaposition. The total cost of Protect and Survive (in a letter to William Stewart TV productions Ltd, INF6/2244) was inexpensive given the techniques involved and was contracted at £37,638 in total. The electronic music for Protect and Survive was composed by an innovative electronic composer Roger Limb (according to the 'music cue sheet') and was used at the beginning and the end of the 20 videos. The videos were complicated pedagogical visual and aural technologies, on a small budget, and there was a desire by innovative creatives to 'play' with the new effects. However, the use of superimposition and electronic sound produced errors:-

It was the sound of fallout coming down, wasn't it? Well, fallout's not going to make a sound, (Laugh) but, but you can't just show it as a sprinkling coming down. You had to put something to it. So, it looks like pitter-patter of particles or something...but you couldn't say to the public that you won't hear fallout because I think that would probably been more, unnerving, you know. There is this unseen or something. I mean because you're not going to see great, huge clouds. I mean, you see the cloud go up if you have to see it.

(Jim, Home Office Scientist)

Jim was surprised to see that, despite scientific advice, in the short Protect and Survive films radioactive fallout, which is invisible and intangible to the senses, was given a sound and image to make it 'knowable', and perhaps intelligible, to the public. Other contributors also found that, in the animation process, their work had been altered. Indeed, the disjunction between the intentions of the creatives and scientists on Protect and Survive and the final product was due in part to the secrecy in which the films were made in and the ways in which they were not involved in the final 'efforts'. For example, the animators and the sound technicians never met in person with the films and audio tracks being (covertly) exchanged in a street in Soho, London:-

I have looked at some of the Protect and Survive films and I notice that in at least one, the jingle I wrote for the animation at the end had been laid in the wrong place. It's at least half a second out. I planned that the resolution of the picture should coincide with the last low note. Ah, the perils of not being able to attend the track laying session!

(Roy, composer for Protect and Survive)

There was also a certain level of distrust from scientists, engineers and creatives about the motives of policy makers and emergency responders in putting into practice the procedures given in the publications:-

My concern was the need for human intervention in passing the message which was relayed at one of 250 Major police stations. It worried me that having received the national attack warning someone at this level might say 'It will cause panic - don't do it' or create a delay in sounding the alarm.

(Simon, Former engineer with responsibility for national warning systems for nuclear war)

There was also the possibility that rather than broadcast Protect and Survive the Army would be able to take possession of some BBC radio and television communication frequencies of a low range:-

These frequencies were low enough to propagate worldwide during sunspot peaks.

(Tim, Radio engineer with expertise in post-nuclear war radio communications)

So 'tacit intentionality' can be seen to arise partly from the complexities of multiple authorship of policies, the distrust by scientists, engineers and creatives of policy and the inevitable errors and compromises that can occur on the way. The design of the policies was not intended to mislead the public (in terms of invisible fallout or warning sounds that are unsynchronised) but design errors and assumptions compounded disadvantage for those who were less informed or with fewer resources for survival.

Secondly, rather than nuclear attack, one of the intentions of nuclear war preparation was to also get the population to prepare for industrial unrest or potential subversion. Nodder writes (letter to O.A. Williams of 6/7/62, National Archives, T227 / 1526):-

This has been finished up at Economic Policy Committee (EPC) with the study of measures to cope with extended strikes. You may remember I referred to a paper on this to you in May when extending control and suppliers' food stocks had been suggested. In E.P.C. last week it was suggested that home stocking up for C.D. (Civil Defence) purposes could be a helpful way of limiting the effect of a major transport strike. The question of measures to deal with extended strikes is to be explored, probably under direction of a committee of ministers.

Therefore, preparation for nuclear attack was considered to a bulwark against subversive activity. Indeed, communist and student activity is considered to be the major threat against civil defence efforts. For example, in the exercise Fallex 1968, a cabinet office simulation of nuclear war, the population is considered to be acquiescent towards civil defence activity and reassured by even the 'voice' of the prime minister whereas students and trade unionists are considered to be

potentially disruptive and the biggest threat to national security. (National Archives, CAB164 / 375). Related to this, the booklets had a wider security purpose than the protection of the general population in terms of winning support for nuclear weapons. The feelings of the population were not just important for their own sake but their robustness was a consideration in national defence (Sharp, 2007). The emotive and the affective were strategically important for national security as was the general public's (particular the white middle classes) acceptance of, and even support for, cold war military production. Whilst it may have been accepted that passivity or even reluctance would have been sufficient for policy makers what politicians required was active forms of citizenship, or what we might call now 'preparedness'. This led to calls to issue the 'Householders Handbook' by politicians even if nuclear war was not likely. E.A. Butler (letter to the Ministerial Committee on civil defence of 31/5/62) stated that:-

There is little doubt that production of such a document would be one of the best means of indicating that we take civil defence seriously and would have a good psychological effect on the general public and on those concerned with civil defence... There is no doubt that the psychological impact would be greater if the booklet were available free of charge to the public. So the debate concerning whether the booklets should be available was not just about the information contained within but also about the wider political purposes of its release.

However, within the civil service there was a view that the production of the handbook should be covert and that copies should not be distributed in peace time. In a series of letters between R.J.P. Hewison in the Home Office and D.M.B. Butt in the Treasury it is considered that production of the booklet should be covert (National Archives, T227/1526). Hewison considers that the purpose of the booklet was not for distribution but rather so that '...stocks could be kept in reserve' (letter to Butt of 8/9/61). Butt's own view in an internal treasury memo was that it would be hard to keep the production of the booklet covert and that '...I doubt whether printing could be covert, and authority angles to be put at a higher level of printing' (handwritten memo attached to the letter from Hewison 11/9/62). Prudently, and considering the difficulty of overt printing of the handbook, Butt considers that the booklet could be produced as a supplement within national newspapers (letter to Hewison of 2/11/62). Hewison considers (letter to Butt of 3/11/62) that this is a '...brilliant suggestion...given the time and difficulties involved in anything like orthodox printing and distribution'.

Thirdly, the scientific difficulties of preparing for such an event as nuclear war meant that assumptions were made about the types of housing that were used in modelling. As the Home Office scientists who were involved in Protect and Survive (Gus and Jim) we interviewed claimed, much of the modelling was conducted on the assumption that individuals would be in houses:-

Interviewer: And, so the assumption was made that people would be in a standard house. And was that just an easy modelling assumption, or was that it would be too difficult to model for people would be in flats or not standard houses?

Gus: My memory is that our working assumption was we didn't do it (model the effects of nuclear weapons) for a range ... it was generally a sort of general built semi-detached house.

Interviewer: Working assumption?

Gus: Yeah, yeah. That's right ... people in flats ... I'm trying to think ... very difficult ... we didn't, we didn't do. We didn't do it. Was difficult enough ... (Laugh)

There were also assumptions about the protection of a robust home:-

Jim:So the whole, the whole context really of Protect and Survive is really to protect *your home* as best you can against the radiation emitted from, from, from fallout. So, you know, you build up a shelter with dense materials in a room and stock it up with food and radio and everything else.

Potentially with a cellar:-

Gus: Yes, yes, if they had cellars - as long as the floor was strong above them, in which case you would be trapped, I mean...so you've gotta be careful for there, the strong, the stronger the, those with thicker walled houses, those with ... windows that are a bit larger as well, and if you kept out of the way maybe you had a hall inside that you can go into or the end of the stairs something like that, which is the sort of, sort of position a lot of people did in World War Two when they're sheltering, yeah. Oh, we put a dummy under, under the stairs, among these stairs. It *sort of survived*, yeah, with thermometers on, things like that. It wasn't just a dummy, but it showed out movements.

Scientists were also not keen on the idea of new public shelters:-

Gus: ... Public shelters ... very expensive...*we ought to look*. Sorry, at one stage, we looked at public shelters. Yes, I've just remembered looking at, looking at the possibilities of using what we've already got like *salt mines in Cheshire*. We looked at that. We looked at the *tunnels in the Isle of Wight*. We looked at, we looked at the tunnels outside the, King's Cross and St. Pancras.

So because of the complexities of modelling, houses were universally chosen in the scientific modelling exercises, the results of which fed into the suggestions for shelters in 'Protect and Survive'. There was also an assumption about domesticity and social control:-

Jim: (home) that was the safest place to be. Don't be out on the street because, if you are, you have a greater chance of exposure to radiation than you would be indoors and you also, you could be exposed to the flash and the fire and the blast. So, you know, you really, you're safest in, indoors with your family preparing for your lot with them

Fourthly, and perhaps more obscurely, the production of the campaigns was not simply an objective and scientific process but was also an exercise in science fiction, or fantasy in which the state simultaneously asks the population to embrace the mundane nature of preparation for nuclear war whilst in the realms of fantasy events. Horrific and apocalyptic language is used which clashes with the supposedly scientific nature of the narratives. As the words of *Protect and Survive* state with use of simile a nuclear explosion is one of '...*great* heat and *bast*' and '...it can be *deadly* dangerous' (not just dangerous) (*Nuclear Explosions Explained*, 1974). Related to this science fiction / horror context, the music of *Protect and Survive* was composed by Roger Limb of the BBC Radiophonic workshop, an experimental electronic pioneer who composed the music for both science fiction programmes (such as *Doctor Who*) and for interruptions of 'real' television (such as testcards). In a sense, then, the documents were 'fantasy documents' for purposes other than the survival of the majority of the population (Clarke, 1999). Indeed, the former Home Office scientists who we interviewed said that they would play out elaborate fictional scenarios of survival and death, often with gallows and surreal humour.

CONCLUSION: TACIT INTENTIONALITY AND DISASTER EDUCATION POLICY DESIGN

As the above discussion has shown tacit intentionality in policy does not arise from simple ignorance of race / class issues or disregard for inequality. In the preparation of the 'Householders Handbook' and *Protect and Survive* there was considerable awareness of the material difficulties of delivering the policy. Concerns of poverty and social provision are raised frequently by civil servants. Rather than tacit intentionality being concerned with ignorance of policy makers – although that obviously is a factor – it is also concerned with structural and ideological issues of production. Firstly, there are issues about the authorial intent and ownership of policy which, in its formation, does not necessarily reflect the views of the authors. A desire to play with the new animation format and distrust between scientists and policy makers made 'Protect and Survive' less useful than it might have been in terms of providing clear information. Secondly, there are issues about conflicting objectives. In this case, national security and (political desire for) support for nuclear weapons rather than the safety of the population led to a conflict of interest. The decision to distribute information (at least from politicians) was about winning consensus rather than ensuring survival. Thirdly, policy science makes assumptions about the subject of policy (this is closest to Gillborn's 2005 sense of tacit intentionality) and their ownership of property and resources. Fourthly, policy documents are 'social science fiction' and not necessarily written for a 'reality' of practice.

Extrapolating this to disaster education policy more generally it seems that 'tacit intentionality' is far from an issue of ignorance. It is not just that there are 'bad', racially unaware civil servants and 'good' racially aware social justice activists. What was revealing from research in the National Archives was just how far civil servants, even in the 1960s and 1970s, were concerned with the equity of

disaster education. Constraints on production of disaster education policy and programmes, within structurally oppressive constraints, means that 'tacit intentionality' can, paradoxically occur even when there is explicit knowledge of the social oppressions at work. As evidence for this, the civil services' concern with inequality in preparation against nuclear attack did not result in a public education programme that reflected this in the final production. It is not, in this case, correct to say that civil servants were unconcerned with equity in (disaster) education policy but the process of policy production led to an inequitable policy.

Finally, it is also easy to dismiss these public education campaigns as being products of their era and castigate them as naïve. Nuclear war is no longer an issue for public education and 'Protect and Survive' was notionally in use until the end of the 1980s when a short film 'When Disaster Strikes' (1987) downgraded nuclear war to one of many civil contingencies. Today, these documents have become kitsch artefacts and are referenced for their amusement compared to what are considered (today) to be more sophisticated preparedness materials. For example, a former home secretary (from the 1990s) we interviewed said of 'Protect and Survive' that:-

...people were advised to put brown paper over their head and all this sort of stuff and that leads to ridicule and in the end we got a bit of flack a bit of ridicule for advising people as to what they should have as a little stash in their houses but the balance that was trying to be achieved there was to give people a feel that this really was serious that you had to think about it your self and the minute you demonstrate that by using any practical examples then people can make fun of it so its quite difficult you know. People bottled water or you got a torch and people say "oh this is a nanny state again"

As the above shows, although 'Protect and Survive' has disappeared themes of individualism and responsabilisation are still current in contemporary policy makers minds. In the current era of 'Prevention of Violent Extremism' (PVE) targeting Muslim's of (almost exclusively) Asian origin and public education campaigns that explicitly racially profile terrorists we might consider that the design of public education campaigns has moved from 'tacit' to 'explicit' racism and racialisation. Few people in the general population took 'Protect and Survive' seriously at the time but the 'new seriousness' of the so-called 'war on terror' has made what was tacit in public education for disaster (racism, a fear of the 'Other') an integral and overt part of the design of disaster education campaigns.

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